Transmitting the Sage's "Heart" (II):Instructing Absolute Practice—The Perfection of the Perfect Teaching in Mou Zongsan's Reconstruction of the Confucian Daotong by Suter, Rafael
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2018
Transmitting the Sage’s ”Heart” (II):Instructing Absolute Practice—The
Perfection of the Perfect Teaching in Mou Zongsan’s Reconstruction of the
Confucian Daotong
Suter, Rafael
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-160948
Journal Article
Published Version
Originally published at:
Suter, Rafael (2018). Transmitting the Sage’s ”Heart” (II):Instructing Absolute Practice—The Perfection
of the Perfect Teaching in Mou Zongsan’s Reconstruction of the Confucian Daotong. Philosophy East
and West, 68(2):516-538.
Transmitting the Sage's "Heart" (II): Instructing Absolute 
Practice—The Perfection of the Perfect Teaching in Mou 
Zongsan's Reconstruction of the Confucian Daotong 
Rafael Suter
Philosophy East and West, Volume 68, Number 2, April 2018, pp. 516-538
(Article)
Published by University of Hawai'i Press
DOI:
For additional information about this article
Access provided by UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek ZÃƒÂƒÃ‚Â¼rich (8 Jan 2019 14:53 GMT) 
https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2018.0044
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/690298
516 Philosophy East & West  Volume 68, Number 2 April 2018 516–538
 © 2018 by University of Hawai‘i Press
TRANSMITTING THE SAGE’S “HEART” (II): INSTRUCTING 
ABSOLUTE PRACTICE — THE PERFECTION OF 
THE PERFECT TEACHING IN MOU ZONGSAN’S 
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CONFUCIAN DAOTONG
Rafael Suter
University of Zurich
rafael.suter@aoi.uzh.ch
Mou Zongsan (1909–1995), one of the main representatives of New Confucianism in 
twentieth-century China, has presented, under the designation of a moral  metaphysics, 
an ambitious philosophical reconstruction of Confucianism drawing both on Kantian 
critique and Buddhist scholasticism. I have argued elsewhere that this “philoso-
phized” Confucianism can be understood as a reformulation of the daotong, the 
traditional view that the correct transmission of the Confucian Way proceeds from a 
master to his disciples. Unlike what Mou’s prominent academic standing, at least in 
his later years, might suggest, the core of Confucianism in his view is thus transmitted 
not in public discourse but in an intimate communication between a teacher and his 
students. Systematically, the reason requiring this restoration of the authority of the 
Confucian teacher is that in Mou’s view the centerpiece of Confucianism is the per-
sonal experience and cultivation of moral feeling. He is convinced that this latter 
discloses to us a moral compass with the potential to guide us on the right path of 
action in any given situation. In his hybrid language, Mou uses the Kantian term 
 “intellectual intuition” to accentuate his view that what we gain access to through 
moral feeling is noumenal rather than sensual, that it belongs to the eternal realm 
of reason rather than to the ephemeral confines of sensation. Precisely because this 
intellectual intuition allegedly is not susceptible to linguistic representation and 
 discursive explanation, it has to invoke the authority of the teacher warranting its 
validity.
Evading linguistic representation, however, is not at all tantamount to escaping 
linguistic expression. Mou elevates the rhetoric of the “perfect teaching” (yuanjiao 
圓­教) to the specific linguistic form of his philosophy. The figure of a perfect teaching 
is borrowed from Tiantai Buddhist scholasticism. Just like the concept of an intellec-
tual intuition, it is thus imported into Confucianism from outside. In what follows, I 
argue that the decisive reason for Mou to dress his philosophy in the guise of a per-
fect teaching is its “non-contending” character (bu zheng 不諍).1 This specificity of 
the perfect teaching rests on two pillars: a peculiar mode of linguistic expression and 
the conviction that the dynamics of its language raises us to a “higher level of truth.”2 
The linguistic design of a perfect teaching allegedly leaves behind argumentative 
discourse with its never-ending seesaw of pros and cons. It is therefore the very form 
of its “non-contending” language that renders the perfect teaching perfect: where 
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there is no actual claim, Mou suggests, there can be no proper refutation. The perfect 
teaching thus surrounds the inscrutable content of moral metaphysics concealed 
in the intimate and externally impenetrable experience of intellectual intuition with 
a rhetorical bulwark repelling any attempt at external criticism by its very design. 
Yet, Mou’s philosophy, thus triumphing over any objection, by the same token also 
deprives itself of the means to speak in its own favor and further underscores its reli-
ance on the authority of its enunciator. At the same time, understanding Mou’s inter-
pretation of the perfect teaching is crucial for grasping two main characteristics of his 
philosophy.
First, tracing Mou’s conception of the perfect teaching and its relation to the 
summum bonum, we can grasp the very mechanism that disconnects the meaning of 
a teaching from its particular linguistic shape. We can comprehend Mou’s tendency, 
surprising for a thinker who sharpened his conceptual tools with the whetstone of 
Kant’s critical philosophy, to conflate, at the very core of his philosophy, what ap-
pears to us the most divergent and incompatible expressions from vastly different 
intellectual traditions. That Mou thinks himself justified to recognize in Kant’s free 
will just another name for what Confucians refer to as liangzhi 良知 (the uncondi-
tioned “genuine knowledge [of the Good]”) or what Buddhists designate as lijing 
理­境 (something like the unconditioned “sphere of Buddha’s reality”) is an imme-
diate consequence of this framework: whether we capture the ultimate meaning to 
which the perfect teaching is directed by the name of “free will,” “liangzhi,” “lijing,” 
“ti” 體, “substance,” “ultimate reality,” or by any other term, our choice will not af-
fect what it is. The common meaning of all these terms is what they designate — the 
reality of the Good — and this remains unaffected by its varying titles.
Second, understanding the perfect teaching, moreover, enables us to appreciate 
its crucial function for establishing what Mou understands as the primacy of practical 
over theoretical reason: perfect doctrines according to Mou are specifically con-
strued in a way leading the individual to experiencing the reality of the Good in his 
or her moral practice. Hence it is inherently connected to the idea of a positive 
 notion of intellectual intuition according to which it is in actu that morality gains its 
exis tential and creative dimension, as through our moral acts we can really change 
our world for the better. Making accessible to us a genuine experience of the actual­
ity or facticity of morality, the perfect teaching also considerably lightens our burden 
theoretically to found it. The reality of morality is essentially independent from our 
representations of it, and what eventually validates our theories about morality is that 
they guide us on the right Way of moral practice. 
Yet, even if we understand why Mou thinks that the framework of a perfect teach-
ing can emend the deficiencies of Kant’s moral theology and of his notion of the 
summum bonum, his specific attempt to translate Kantianism into the form of a per-
fect teaching, his so-called two-tiered ontology, at least on Kantian terms patently 
fails.
After this rather disconcerting conclusion, I shall propose, in the second part of 
this essay, a more charitable reading of Mou: I argue that there is a close resemblance 
of Mou’s attempt to rescue traditional Confucian views of an intuitive access to truth 
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to the project of those German idealists who tried to reconcile the truth of reason 
with the inherited truth of revelation.
We shall, moreover, see that there is a certain tension in what Mou says. If he is 
right, what the Confucian teacher transmits is a universally accessible truth — even if 
it is intuitive in nature, it is an insight into what is morally good. In Hegelian terms, 
Confucianism with Mou thus has become subjective rather than merely positive. 
Taken to the letter, Mou’s restoration of the authority of the teacher therefore even-
tually seems to be built on sand: if he is unwilling to qualify and thus trim the subjec-
tive character of moral intuition, he has to forsake the authority of tradition. If he 
really endorses the consequences of his “subjectivization” of the Confucian tradition, 
Mou has to acknowledge that moral intuition is a common good of all people rather 
than the privilege of a small group of educated Confucians.
I shall eventually conclude with a short and very preliminary sketch adumbrating 
how Mou’s thought, once stripped of its grandiose metaphysical rhetoric, might fruit-
fully be related to the problem of human freedom in the tension between rationalism 
and naturalism.
Philosophy as a Kowtow to Confucius
I start my discussion with a short look at the conclusion of Mou’s last major work, 
The Perfect Good, which highlights the crucial role of the perfect teaching for his 
thought. Mou writes here the following verses:
In China, just as in the West, there were wise men, and there were sages,
Their ultimate resort men find in founding
Varied spelling out of the perfect teaching.
And in this endeavor, Confucius was to reach the truth.3
Mou in a final eulogy eventually continues:
The Confucian Sage tacitly harbored Heaven’s constant norm within himself,
Mencius broke the dark, disclosed the light of sun and moon, illuminating a new dawn.
. . .
A light, though, obfuscated by both Master Zhu Xi and Cheng Yi.
A light which Lu Xiangshan in reading Mencius attained within himself,
A light whose norm was newly gauged and truly mastered by Wang Yangming,
A norm perfectly contained in the Four Affirmations and Four Negations of its Goodness,
A norm whose perfect teaching was only raised by Wang Ji.
As a single-rooted unified body and embodiment, it is true perfection,
. . .
As virtue and happiness indistinctly unify in this perfect actual fact,
Why toil oneself to claim a God for effectuating [this reconciliation] in our stead?
I now and here proclaim and reclaim the Perfect Good,
In a kowtow to the model left behind by Confucius.4
Given its prominent position at the end of Mou’s last major publication, in many 
respects a summa of his lifework, this poetic resumé of the book’s last chapter, on the 
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“perfect teaching” of Confucianism, also appears like a condensed formula of his 
entire philosophical heritage. Essentially, Mou’s hymn is an emphatic confession to 
Confucius. And although the word itself finds no mention, when Mou delineates the 
transmission and growing awareness of that inner constant norm that allegedly led 
Confucius on his Way of moral cultivation, which was explicated by Mencius and 
eventually elevated to the level of a “perfect teaching” by Wang Ji 王畿 (Longxi 龍溪) 
(1498–1583), he offers his version of the Confucian daotong. Attributing to Con-
fucius the attainment of the apogee of wisdom as that which introduces the “perfect 
teaching,” Mou conceals that he borrows the very notion of a “perfect teaching” from 
a Buddhist context.5 Mou’s poem, mentioning the “West” at its very beginning, relo-
cates the continuity of the Way in a context of global competition.
Largely coinciding with Westernization, modernization in twentieth-century 
China is perceived as a challenge to the continuation of Chinese culture.6 Intimately 
related to the model of self-cultivation allegedly harkening back to Confucius, Chi-
nese culture for Mou essentially rests on a deeply ingrained sense of morality. After 
all, it was his inner moral compass that invested the historical Confucius with the 
authority to become the paragon of a specifically Chinese paradigm of moral cultiva-
tion.7 His own contribution to the daotong Mou situates in the context of the con-
frontation of Confucian moral cultivation with the West. When he claims the “Perfect 
Good” (yuanshan 圓善), Kant’s summum bonum, Mou does nothing less than to 
proclaim the universal significance of the Way, as, in his view, the philosophical 
deficiencies of Kant are manifest exactly in his inability to conceive a viable concept 
of the summum bonum. This purported insufficiency marks the point where Mou 
sees himself justified to claim the ability, by virtue of standing in the line of transmis-
sion of the Confucian Way, to lead to completion what the German philosopher was 
incapable of achieving, namely really to rank morality higher than empirical knowl-
edge and to endorse an emphatic notion of the priority of practical over theoretical 
or speculative reason. To be sure, the name of Kant here is an epitome of Western 
philosophy as a whole, and Mou leaves no doubt that it was the limitations of his 
Western background that impeded Kant. The purported shortcomings of the exter-
nally dominant West thus most strikingly surface in the limitations of its most ad-
vanced philosophy, Kantianism.8 As I have shown elsewhere, the crucial step in 
Mou’s appropriation of Kantian moral philosophy lies in his identification of Kant’s 
notion of autonomy with the Mencian “heart” (xin 心).
Consequently, his short poem stages as the key persons of the correct line of 
transmission of the Way the main representatives of the xinxue 心學, “learning of the 
heart,” and he takes the opportunity to accuse the obfuscation, by their opponents of 
the “orthodox” Cheng-Zhu school, of the moral autonomy allegedly enshrined in the 
Mencian heart. As is widely known, Mou’s integration of Kantian autonomy into the 
framework of Confucianism hinges on his adoption of a positive notion of “intellec-
tual intuition,” imagined to reveal, in moral feeling, the norm that leads the Confu-
cian sage and that realizes or embodies itself in moral action. Moral action is here 
conceived as the experience in actu of the empirical subject’s dislimitation and the 
alleged realization of man’s essence as an infinite or unlimited being.9 It is precisely 
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to this ecstatic practice of morality that the “perfect actual fact” of Mou’s poem refers. 
As in this “perfect actual fact” morality and happiness allegedly coalesce, it renders 
obsolete Kant’s notion of the summum bonum, which can only relegate us to a mere 
hope — though justified rationally — that there is a God who eventually bridges the 
radically separate spheres of sensual happiness and intellectual morality. The linguis-
tic resemblance of the Chinese equivalents for “Perfect Good” (yuanshan 圓善) and 
“perfect teaching” (yuanjiao 圓教) thus reflects their intimate relation in the context 
of Mou’s moral philosophy: the perfect teaching provides Mou with a language for 
speaking about the Perfect Good. Ultimately treating language as a means of instruc-
tion rather than representation, a perfect teaching is imagined to clear the way to our 
personal experience of the actual reality of an unconditioned Good.
Mou on the Perfect Teaching in Tiantai Buddhism
If we want to understand the systematic implications of Mou’s decision to choose 
the form of the perfect teaching as the adequate linguistic expression for his own 
philosophy, we first have to see how according to Mou it is used its original context, 
the scholastic literature of the Buddhist Tiantai school. He has dedicated half of his 
two-volume work on Chinese Buddhism, Buddhatva and Prajñā (1977), to this de-
nomination.10 Although basically a collection of exegetical notes and terminological 
clarifications on various Buddhist texts, Mou makes it clear in his introduction that 
he composes this book as a historian of Chinese philosophy rather than as a Bud-
dhologist. Accordingly, he claims impartiality for his view that the perfect teaching of 
Tiantai represents the intellectual culmination of Buddhist scholastics in China.11 The 
purpose of the perfect teaching is doxographical: it is designed for integrating the 
immense multiplicity of the Buddha’s teachings and their interpretations into a single 
comprehensive, and hence perfected, framework.
The Method and Form of the Perfect Teaching
Mou recognizes in the perfect teaching a formidable linguistic tool to provide the 
required figure of this all-inclusiveness: in their expositions, instead of claiming defi-
nite doctrinal contents (jiaoyi 教義), Tiantai exegetes are said to concentrate on the 
ultimate concern of their teaching: the Buddha’s universal realization of liberation.12 
Unlike other doctrinal traditions such “genuine explanations” (zhengshuo 正說)13 
establish linguistic distinctions exclusively as a means for pointing toward this reality 
beyond language.14 Sentences here are not viewed as asserting definite propositions. 
Thus “sterilized” (si 死) as bearers of independent meaning or propositional truth, 
they are considered mere “expedients” (quan 權) of the Buddha’s salvific work. As 
testimonies of this soteriological practice, his various teachings are recognized as 
ultimately identical in commonly pointing toward one and the same reality: the 
 inconceivable realm of the reality of the Buddha’s universal liberation (li 理, jing 境, 
or li jing 理境). This reality, hence, is the single meaning common to all of his teach-
ings.15 In spite of their fundamental difference, the teachings belong to the relative 
realm of conditioned arising and the reality of the Buddha to the absolute realm of 
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liberation; the teachings, insofar as they are efficacious means of liberation, also 
partake in the reality of liberation and in this respect prove identical to it (quan jishi 
shi 權即是實).16 According to Mou, Tiantai exegesis thus reveals a paradoxical “iden-
tity” of expedients and reality.17 The real meaning (yili zhi shi 義理之實) of a perfect 
teaching consequently does not belong to the sphere of semantics; it is the reality of 
liberation.18
This reality, according to Mou, can also be grasped in very concrete terms: 
 “[becoming a] Buddha necessarily coincides with each and every single action of 
the ordinary and deluded person, of the [followers] of the two vehicles, and of the 
bodhisattvas. . . . It is precisely here [i.e., in action] that the Buddha coincides with 
all sentient beings.”19 When acting out of compassion, even the unawakened partake 
in the reality of his salvific practice. It is here, in practice, that the absolute proves 
ultimately identical to the relative.
In Mou’s view, this coincidence of the absolute realm of liberation with the rela-
tive realm of individual practice sets Tiantai apart from other Buddhist denomina-
tions. Unlike them, the perfect teaching of this tradition in Mou’s view has an onto­
logical bearing “showing up in a process of practice discarding [the harmful effects 
of the illusionary] without discarding [the illusionary itself ].”20 For Mou, this perspec-
tive abstains from simply rejecting the ordinary world of deluded sentient beings as 
a mere illusion that should ultimately be overcome. The Buddha does not abide in a 
realm free of falseness and illusion. His world is ours, but unlike ignorant beings like 
us, who suffer from illusion and falseness, he sees through the mechanisms behind 
and turns them into means of salvation.
Note that what we encounter here is reminiscent of Mou’s vision of Confucian-
ism: the Buddhist practitioner in his compassionate act immediately experiences the 
efficiency of an absolute reality. Just as the empirical subject in Mou’s moral meta-
physics is said to turn into an agent of morality, both limited by remaining the con-
crete person he was before and unlimited by coalescing with the unlimited moral 
heart itself, the undetached and ignorant sentient being in the moment of engaging 
in an act of compassion is imagined to partake in the reality of the Buddha’s universal 
liberation.
The Linguistic Form of the Perfect Teaching
As we have mentioned above, the specificity of the language of the perfect teaching 
is in its non-contending character, which is in turn entwined with the notion of a 
non-contending wisdom. In the state of non-contending wisdom, one listening to the 
Buddha’s words does not take the various formulations of his teachings to the letter. 
The attempt to seek for consistency by discarding incompatibilities or contradictions 
appears obsolete to him.21 All words of the Buddha are recognized as nothing but 
means of salvation. According to this view, their particular claims in the last resort 
appear ultimately irrelevant. According to Mou, the exclusively “instrumental” char-
acter of the Buddha’s speech renders his words “unnecessary” so that objecting to 
them appears futile.22 For Mou, necessity is a privilege of the absolute and ultimately 
all-inclusive reality of the Buddha. For this reason, nothing that can be asserted in 
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differentiating speech can be necessary. Non-contending wisdom accepts the incon-
sistencies and contradictions in Buddha’s teachings as an effect not of what he claims 
but to whom he preaches. From this perspective, raising a genuine objection against 
any of the Buddha’s words ipso facto implies debasing oneself by getting involved in 
a less-inclusive and hence deficient mode of linguistic practice. Thus, for Mou, “non- 
contending wisdom” “is opposed to differentiating speech without belonging to the 
same level.”23
On the purely linguistic level, “non-contending” wisdom has to be couched in 
a “non-contending perfect teaching” in “non-differentiating terms.”24 There can be 
only one non-contending perfect teaching, as, in contradistinction to less inclusive 
teachings, its “non-contending character” obliges it to desist from presenting disput-
able, let alone disprovable explanations.25 The linguistic strategy for overcoming the 
deficiencies of differentiating speech is the “paradox” (guijue 詭譎): whatever is pos-
itively asserted is immediately hedged by the opposite contention. However, this 
negation is not supposed simply to cancel the preceding positive claim. Rather it is 
aimed at elevating the consciousness of the listener above the mode of thinking in 
binary opposites. Aware of the soteriological sterility of thinking in alternatives, non- 
contending perfect teachings discard the search for clarity by binary decisions: a 
non-contending perfect teaching does not rebuff objections, because such a step 
would force it back into the deficient realm of apparent alternatives. Rather, by virtue 
of its all-inclusiveness a non-contending perfect teaching simply defuses objections 
by absorbing them. The defect of differentiating speech, which Mou supposes the 
perfect teaching to cure, is thus its very property of being contestable: “All differenti-
ating speech is contestable.26 There is a possibility of manifold alternatives all of 
which cannot be perfect.”27
On the Perfect Doctrine of Confucianism
When Mou applies this paradigm of the perfect teaching to Confucianism, he 
states — in some tension with what he elsewhere says with respect to the Buddha’s 
soteriological practice — that the perfect teaching of Confucianism “differs from Bud-
dhism and Daoism in that it cannot directly be arrived at by means of paradoxi-
cal language,”28 but rather “evolves from a moral consciousness [that] anchors it 
vertically in moral creation.”29 This suggests that, for Mou, the specific emphasis on 
morality so typical for Confucianism is not essential to perfect teachings per se. How-
ever, there is one key passage in Buddhatva and Prajñā where Mou suggests that a 
genuine perfect teaching does indeed require a moral consciousness, even if this may 
have gone unnoticed by Buddhist exegetes:
The Buddha is [still] a sage according to a one-sided paradigm (pianzhixing zhi sheng­
ren 偏至型之聖人). When the Tiantai speaks about perfect reality (yuanshi 圓實) it 
does so with respect to this one-sided paradigm of the Buddha. However, the point 
where the kind of perfect reality that it speaks about is ultimately realized rather is the 
case of the Confucian sage. The Buddha still has to develop moral consciousness (daode 
yishi 道德意識). Only then is he able completely to achieve perfect reality. (emphasis 
mine)30
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For Mou, the Buddhists, in spite of providing the perfect paradigm of wisdom, 
seem unable to complement it with the most accurate model of cultivation, namely 
the “cultivation of the inner sage” (neisheng gongfu 內聖功夫).31 In the same book 
Mou writes in the same vein:
We can only say that, when Buddhism, at the end of its sweeping development, has 
reached its highest peak, namely the perfect teaching of the Tiantai, in the last conse-
quence it still leads to the Confucian sage’s sphere of being a “prisoner of Heaven (tian 
zhi lu min 天之戮民) [Confucius’ self-designation in Zhuangzi 6.6].”32
Mou thus clearly distinguishes between the “one-sided perfection” (pianyuan 偏圓) 
of the Buddha and the “well-adjusted” or “genuine perfection” (zhengyuan 正圓) of 
the Confucian sage.33 I think that Mou’s contention that, ultimately, Buddhist and 
Confucian perfection lead to the same sphere can be interpreted in the sense that, 
strangely enough, Confucianism is the ultimate realization of what Buddhist prac-
tice is aimed at. For Mou, there is no doubt that its moral character exalts the Confu-
cian Way over Buddhism. Mou, hence, is convinced that Buddhism indeed does 
imply a moral dimension that Buddhist scholasticism, however, fails to recognize or 
to acknowledge.
As we have seen, Mou credits Wang Ji for providing Confucianism with a perfect 
teaching when, in his “four negations” of Wang Yangming’s “teaching in four sen-
tences,” he rejects the distinction of “good” versus “bad” for the successive levels 
of the genuine heart itself (xin zhi ti 心之體), the intentions preceding one’s actions 
(yi 意), the awareness of the moral character of these intentions (liangzhi 良知), and 
the actual performance of one’s actions (ge wu 格物).34
Given its crucial role for his conception of a specifically Confucian understand-
ing of autonomy, it is hardly surprising that Mou’s discussion here revolves around 
Wang Ji’s treatment of the notion of the “heart” or “mind” (xin). Setting in with a 
qualification of Wang Ji’s expression of a “heart without a heart” (wu xin zhi xin 無­心
之心), Mou clarifies that the expression wu 無 here “only means an absence on the 
level of the presentational function of the heart, that is, an absence of consciousness. 
It is no absence on the level of existence (cunyou shang 存有上).”35 For Mou, Wang 
thus distinguishes the genuine heart itself from its manifestation as an awareness of 
the moral value of our acts. Characterizing the genuine heart as “knowledge without 
the distinctive characteristics of knowledge” (wu zhi xiang zhi zhi 無知相之知), Mou 
suggests that the genuine heart is real even if it is possible that one is not aware of it. 
For him, “genuine knowledge of the Good (liangzhi) is always spontaneous (ziran 
自­然) and never brought about intentionally (you yi 有意).”36
Apparently it is precisely this spontaneity that authenticates its ontological 
 dimension. Mou’s point seems to be that genuine knowledge, due to its non- 
intentional character, is not prone to the potentially distorting effects of cognitive 
representation. If it is exclusively in cognition that illusion and error arise, something 
instantiating itself spontaneously and entirely independently from representational 
cognition consequently cannot fall victim to either. We thus have to distinguish gen-
uine knowledge as the uncaused cause of moral action from genuine knowledge as 
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the conscience of the moral value of our actions allegedly springing from that source. 
The latter is knowledge of something, and hence displays what Mou calls the “char-
acteristic of knowledge” — it is relational and relative in character. Contrary to this, 
the former is pure actual presence devoid of any relative knowledge of something. 
It is characterized as a “clear awareness” (mingjue 明覺). With regard to Wang Ji’s 
controversial claim that genuine knowledge (liangzhi) is neither good nor bad, Mou 
explains that the norm of moral judgment epitomized in genuine knowledge is not 
susceptible to either of these expressions. The application to it of both predicates 
rather turns out to be “meaningless.”37
The perfect teaching of Confucianism as presented by Mou purportedly deals 
with differentiating language in exactly the same way as does Tiantai exegesis: Wang 
Ji negates the predicates that he had previously asserted affirmatively. His intention 
obviously is not bluntly to deny his positive claims. The affirmative assertion is not 
canceled, but only modified by negation. Genuine knowledge is good, as it is the 
source and cause allowing us to recognize and realize what is good. At the same 
time, it also is not good, because, as the absolute standard of good and bad, it is not 
good in a privative sense, which would imply something bad opposed to it. The effect 
of this “paradoxation” is the metaphorization of the predicate — the subject escapes 
the assignment of the predicate, which is only transferred to it in a figurative sense.
It is easy to see that there will be no predicate that does not allow for being 
 treated in an analogous way. We can thus infer that, ultimately, such a mechanism of 
mutual neutralization of affirmation and negation is infinite, necessarily leaving the 
subject toward which the predications are directed out of the reach of language. Even 
if there would be something absolutely good it would not be possible to capture it by 
the common assertive use of predicative language. Precisely for answering the ques-
tion how it can be grasped at all, Mou designs a specific kind of perfect teaching.
Inclusive Perfect Teachings: Toward Experiencing the Absolute
When he adopts the paradigm of the perfect teaching for his brand of Confucianism, 
Mou introduces a subcategory of perfect teachings, which he calls “inclusive” (ying 
盈). They are said to be able to disclose (langxian 朗現) an unlimited heart or mind 
by virtue of individual practice.38 In his attempt to delineate the way that allegedly 
allows one to arrive at such an inclusive teaching, Mou states that “although knowl-
edge of one single path only reveals one meaning (yi 義), it is nonetheless an un-
limited heart or mind; for that reason, the single meaning that it reveals in spite of the 
doctrine’s limits is not limited itself. As a consequence, one also does not stick to that 
meaning by excluding others. The reason is that if it would exclude others the heart 
or mind would no more be unlimited.”39
This ability of revealing meaning without sticking to specific doctrinal formulae 
is identified by Mou as the “pervasive” or “universal” (tong 通) character of inclusive 
teachings. Obviously, this pervasive character itself is no teaching, but simply the 
“mutual pervasion of individual perfect and inclusive teachings.”40 Rendered in terms 
of Mou’s paradoxical language, one thus has a teaching without the “‘characteristics 
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of a teaching’ (jiaoxiang 教相): one grasps the meaning and forgets the teaching.”41 
Mou, who elsewhere defines a teaching as “whatever suffices to instigate human 
reason and to guide human beings to practice the purification of their human lives to 
the utmost degree,”42 obviously does not consider the Confucian teaching a theoret-
ical or exegetical exposition,43 but rather an instruction for a practice of moral self- 
perfection. Its “meaning” consequently is disclosed to an individual precisely when 
it is overwhelmed and compelled to action by his or her moral feeling. For Mou this 
“feeling,” as we have seen, is not part of the sensual human subject but rather indic-
ative of its coalescence with the unlimited moral mind — Mou’s genuine heart. Mou 
understands it as the moral law imposing itself on an individual subject and trans-
lating into spontaneous action. As genuine awareness of the moral law is claimed 
exclusively to occur in the very performance of a moral act, its meaning is always 
actual. This also implies that it eventually evades representation: the real meaning of 
the moral norm or law is its being executed. Isolated from its concrete experience, 
the moral norm hence remains a void catchword. The single possibility to understand 
it is to experience it.
What is called the “real truth” in the Tiantai exegesis therefore coincides for Mou 
with the “moral norm” (li 理) of Confucians. Precisely because this meaning is some-
thing actual and essentially non-linguistic, Mou suggests that it is not essential to it 
how it is named. In my view, this is the essence of Mou’s statement above on the 
inclusive teaching: as perfect teachings are designed to lead to practical moral action 
and thereby to the actual awareness of the moral norm, they are ultimately condu-
cive to the revelation of one and the same meaning. Essentially non-linguistic, this 
ultimate meaning remains the same although its designation varies according to dif-
ferent perfect teachings.
Absolute Meaning and the Task of Rescuing Kantianism
When, in the preface to his Phenomenon and the Thing in Itself, Mou elevates the 
method of understanding the various teachings, “according to their meaning rather 
than to their formulations,”44 to the status of a leading principle of his philosophical 
engagement with different Chinese traditions, but also with Kantian moral philos-
ophy, he suggests that in spite of their vastly different backgrounds and concerns 
there is a way to read these extremely divergent writings with regard to their  allegedly 
ultimate goal: the attainment in actu of an awareness of the meaning of the moral 
norm. Kant’s summum bonum for him is thus simply yet another name pointing to-
ward this essence of moral practice: in the monograph dedicated to this notion, Mou 
consequently claims that the solution to the “Western” problem of the “Highest 
Good” as highlighted by Kant can be found in the moral norm of the perfect teach-
ings of the East.45 Mou closes his discussions on the Perfect Good with the statement 
that “if the perfect teaching is achieved, then the Perfect Good is clarified. . . . Philo-
sophical thought (sikao 思考) ends at this point.”46
Western doctrines, Christianity, and, more specifically, Kant’s moral theology in 
the framework of the perfect teaching are classified as “exclusive teachings” (lijiao 
526 Philosophy East & West
離­教). For understanding this term, remember that the opposite, “inclusive teach-
ings,” were defined by Mou by their potential to disclose the unlimited heart by indi-
vidual practice. Yet, according to Mou, awareness of the unlimited or absolute in 
Christianity remains on the level of linguistic distinctions: it is conceptualized as an 
ultimately void reification termed God. Conceived as an absolute Other, it is stuck at 
the level of representation. Because as such it is understood in terms of an absolute 
difference, the aim of an inclusive perfect doctrine, namely to attain an awareness of 
an essential or underlying identity of the empirical self with God in moral practice, 
seems out of reach.
As we have just said, even Kant relies on the concept of God as the capstone 
of his moral philosophy, which thereby transforms into a moral theology. From 
the perspective of a perfect teaching it consequently falls into the category of an 
 “exclusive” teaching. Completing Kant for Mou therefore requires raising it to an 
“inclusive” one, and this intention is tantamount to claiming that it has to provide 
for the possibility that the absolute can be practically experienced. Precisely this 
is what is warranted, in Mou’s philosophy, by the positive notion of intellectual 
 intuition.
In applying to Kant’s moral philosophy the framework of the “inclusive” perfect 
teaching with its orientation toward a practical experience of absolute reality in 
 moral action, Mou for one thing is forced to treat it in the same way as Christian 
theology, and we may suspect that it is for this reason that the fundamental differ-
ence between both critical philosophy and dogmatic metaphysics and theology might 
have escaped his attention; for another, much more vexingly, it might have escaped 
his attention that what is the highest merit of Kant’s philosophy in his view, namely 
the transcendental foundation of the a priori and universal character of moral auton-
omy, essentially hinges on preserving the fundamental conceptual distinctions and 
theoretical premises of critique. Identifying Kant’s philosophical language as a mere 
expedient for the ultimate realization of moral practice in the framework of a per-
fect teaching is to forsake the foundation of critique as a whole. Moral autonomy 
deprived of its specific conceptual design ends up as mere figurative speech. Even if 
we accept Mou’s claim that in moral action we can become aware of the reality of 
an unconditioned moral norm, it appears meaningless to interpret this in terms of an 
actual experience of man’s moral autonomy — at least if one appeals to the respective 
Kantian concept.47
We conclude that the very framework of the perfect teaching itself, if applied to 
Kantian critique, cannot but distort the latter’s essentials. Yet, what Mou claims is 
exactly that the paradigm of a perfect teaching enables one to conceive of a Kantian 
Perfect Good without the need to hope for God as its exclusive, yet merely ideal 
guarantee. The reason put forward by Mou is that only a perfect teaching can warrant 
that “practical reason is fully realized,”48 a phrase obviously alluding to the kind of 
realization of the genuine heart in one’s concrete moral act allegedly accessed 
through intellectual intuition. As Mou sees it, Kant was forced to conceive of moral-
ity and religion as two separate spheres, because the Chinese tradition of a perfect 
teaching was unavailable to him. Consequently, Mou purports, Kant lacked a frame-
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work allowing for a rational way to acknowledge a possibility of actually experienc-
ing the absolute. For Kant, the absolute had to stay separated from the moral subject, 
Mou seems to suggest, because of the “exclusive” character of the Christian doctrine, 
which is a theology and hence unable to conceive of the absolute as anything else 
than an “anthropomorphic God.”
Trapped in Paradox: On Critique and Dogmatism
A First Conclusion: Reason and Tradition Unreconciled — The Failure of Moral 
Metaphysics
Mou’s philosophized Confucianism vests into a Kantian guise the transmission of 
knowledge and practice of the “genuine heart.” Thus, “orthodox transmission” — as 
Julia Ching once translates daotong — just as in imperial Neo-Confucianism,  “emerges 
finally as the transmission of the ‘sage’s hsin’.”49 This heart being a purely internal 
matter, the Confucian sage, though in possession of a higher level of truth, is divested 
of any means to make it understood to others. Neither his way of knowing nor his 
mode of speaking are communicable in an ordinary sense of the word. The truth 
of the sage’s words therefore cannot be warranted by what he says but only by the 
fact that it is he who says it. Authority is transferred from the enunciation to the 
 enunciator.
So far, our assessment of Mou’s translation of Neo-Confucianism into philosoph-
ical terms seems rather sobering. Taking Mou’s discussions of central Kantian con-
cepts to the letter often simply leaves one at a loss. What is more, the peculiar fabric 
of Mou’s philosophy indeed strongly suggests that it was not least designed for immu-
nizing traditional morality and scholarship against the potentially detrimental impact 
of modernization.
Outlook: Resolving the Contradiction — Rationalizing Tradition
At the beginning of this essay, I announced that I intended to adumbrate the possibil-
ity of a more reconciliatory and charitable perspective on Mou’s moral metaphysics. 
In this endeavor, I proceed in two steps.
First, I compare Mou’s attempt to rescue the authority of tradition to Hegel’s 
 endeavor to vindicate the revealed truth of Christianity. Not only do both Hegel and 
Mou side with a transmitted truth whose value is questioned by the universal claim 
of the truth of reason, but both thinkers also emphasize the role of the subject.
In a second step, I proceed to ask — all by admitting the inextricable incom pati-
bilities resulting from Mou’s intertwining of Kantianism, Confucianism, and Buddhism 
 — if there is a way of making good sense of Mou’s moral metaphysics. I  argue that 
among philosophers, Mou is by no means alone in his liberal use of his prede-
cessors’ concepts and ideas, and that consequently his thought indeed deserves our 
attempt to make better sense of it. I think that one can read Mou as saying some-
thing relevant about human freedom, and I suggest that his talk about the unlimited 
or finite character of human beings can be read in a sense that is not exclusively 
figurative.
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Mou and German Idealism: Defending Tradition
Let me now first turn to post-Kantian German philosophy. In the preface to his early 
work Christianity as a Positive Religion, Hegel writes that his essay intends to “derive 
that now discarded theology from what we now know as a need of human nature 
and would thus exhibit its naturalness and inevitability. An attempt to do this pre-
supposes the belief that the convictions of many centuries, regarded as sacrosanct, 
true, and obligatory by the millions who lived and died by them in those centuries, 
were not, at least on their subjective side, downright folly or plain immorality. If the 
whole fabric of dogmatic theology is expounded, by the favorite method of using 
general concepts, as a relic of the Dark Ages, untenable in an enlightened epoch, we 
are still humane enough to raise the question: how is it possible to explain the con-
struction of a fabric that is so repugnant to human reason and so erroneous through 
and through?”50 When Hegel sets out to prove that dogmatic theology, which had 
come to be rejected as incompatible with the truth of reason, is in fact natural and 
hence inevitable, a central motive for him is his respect and appreciation for the 
millions who based all their hopes and their efforts on this allegedly altogether irra-
tional and fundamentally absurd foundation. The deep scorn of his age for everything 
that was holy and valuable to previous centuries is for Hegel indicative of an attitude 
of outright inhumanity. And what is more, explaining the triumph of dogmatic theol-
ogy as a mere result of a contamination of the “love of truth” by impure motives and 
instrumentalization for him “presupposes a deep contempt for man and the presence 
of a glaring superstition in his intellect.”51 The wholesale rejection of dogmatic the-
ology in the name of enlightened reason, which, according to Hegel, plainly ignores 
the eternal to which religion had attached the accidental, eventually is to be blamed, 
in his view, for its superficiality.52
Hegel aims to disprove the suspicion of the self-declared advocators of reason 
that the Christian faith because of its origin in Jesus’ words and deeds can be re-
garded as merely positive and hence eventually accidental in character. By “positive” 
Hegel designates religion as based on mere authority and handed down as a matter 
of fact. He opposes to it the “subjective,” which refers to religion as arising from 
people’s hearts.
Hegel’s attempt at detecting the subjective aspects of the Christian faith here 
strikingly parallels Mou Zongsan’s intention to argue for an interpretation of Confu-
cian tradition that connects authority back to subjectivity. Mou denies the mere pos-
itivity or contingency of the Confucian Way. With Hegel he shares a high respect for 
the tradition in which he stands and the belief that the testimony of the centuries 
forbids one simply to discard it as outright folly.
Widening our scope on nineteenth-century German philosophy, it seems admis-
sible to argue that German idealism to a considerable degree could be characterized 
by the aim of reconciling truth of reason and truth of revelation — very obviously so 
in the work of Schelling. In a way, tradition is here defended against the suspicion 
of mere accident and hence both inessentiality and irrelevance by reinterpreting it 
under the guidance of reason. That such a need came to be felt is obviously  connected 
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to the fact that the age of enlightenment in general and Kantian critique in particular 
have presented ways not only of conceiving morality in exclusively rational and sub-
jective terms, but also of conceiving religion purely in terms of morality. Mou Zong-
san, this is to say, shares with German idealists not only the concern for a tradition 
apparently rendered widely obsolete but also the philosophical point of reference — 
the imposition of the solid rock of Kantian critique.53 Just like Hegel, who remarks 
that religion becomes positive only when it contradicts freedom, Mou, too, contrary 
to the clamor of radical iconoclasts in China’s twentieth century, intends to show that 
it is, after all, the spirit of freedom rather than of slavery that makes up the core of 
Confucianism.
Subjectivity and the End of Authority
This last point eventually allows us to adumbrate a slight dialectical twist — arguably 
unintended — in Mou’s argument: in my previous discussion I expressed my con-
cerns regarding the complete internalization of Mou’s moral metaphysics and the 
intriguing lack of any external criteria for evaluating its claims. Let us, for now, con-
centrate on the critical potential that a philosophy may have in engendering a pro-
cess of emancipation of the individual, rather than on the sort of epistemological 
critique in the more technical sense we have been concerned with so far. The kind of 
commitment to ideals of general acceptance and high prestige such as freedom or 
virtue, emphatically proclaimed in Mou’s confession of a substantial Confucian hu-
maneness along with the obvious lack of verifiable external criteria, at least in prin-
ciple opens up space for anyone to claim his or her share in these precious goods. 
True, the very lack of explicit criteria gives way to arbitrariness if one likes to put it 
in negative terms. Yet, isn’t this what under more favorable circumstances we could 
just as well call by the notable name of freedom? The teacher whose authority rests 
exclusively on his internal experience, which remains ineffable and hence inexpli-
cable to anyone else, also has nothing to oppose to someone else who lays claim on 
the same authority except his belief and his appeal to other generally acknowledged 
authorities.
By his choice of placing the subjective awareness and realization of the genuine 
heart at the center of his moral metaphysics, Mou evidently valued these higher than 
the authority of the Sage. Confucius after all is the Sage only because he perfectly 
embodies the genuine heart. Stripped of the seal of the genuine heart there simply 
can be no authority for Confucius. By will or not: what can be suspected as a tool for 
monopolizing for the Confucian expert on inner morality the privilege of interpreting 
tradition, and what can be argued to have been coined exactly for this purpose, if 
taken seriously, at the same time deprives that expert of any means whatsoever for 
plausibly arguing for his privilege on the basis of reference to anything non-internal. 
If Mou presents himself as a Confucian authority on the basis of his knowledge and 
education rather than his wisdom — which is what he doubtless does — he eventually 
seems to fail on his own standards.
As Zheng Jiadong has noticed, the fact that Mou’s attempts at rehabilitating Con-
fucianism hardly leave the narrow confines of academia suggests that he actually 
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joins in a tradition of scholarship rather than a practice of the Confucian Way.54 He 
doubts that Mou’s New Confucianism is able to live up to its own ideal of unifying 
scholarship and practical teaching.55 We might add that even if this would turn out 
to be possible, scholarship has definitely forfeited the means for canceling the con-
sequences of Mou’s philosophization of tradition: if Mou indeed succeeds in proving 
that Confucianism in its essence is subjective rather than positive, this irrevocably 
implies the priority of what he came to designate by the Kantian name of moral 
 autonomy over any merely accidental fact about historical Confucianism. If Confu-
cianism has really become subjective, if its core is warranted by reason — as Mou 
claims — and if, therefore, it has become necessary or inevitable rather than a mere 
accident of history, this also means that its immanent validity exclusively rests on its 
rational nature — be it accessed via conceptual thought or intellectual intuition.
The Irreducibility of Freedom: Making Sense of Mou’s Two­Tiered Ontology
In the final part of this essay I eventually want to come back to Mou’s philoso-
phy proper. Much of the criticism of Mou’s reference to Kant’s thought — my own 
included — tries to make sense of his writings by taking to the letter the Kantian con-
cepts to which he refers. One might at least ask whether this is actually doing justice 
to him. Just think of the freedom that Kant accords himself in reinterpreting, say, 
Plato’s concept of idea, Aristotle’s concept of category, or the rationalist notion of the 
thing-in-itself: it seems quite clear that none of these appropriations would be ap-
proved by experts strictly insisting on the meaning of these concepts in their original 
context. It therefore seems almost imperative at least to attempt a more conciliatory 
reading of Mou.56
At this point, my own attempt has to remain very modest: what I would like to 
emphasize is that Mou tells us much more than might be expected from his hermet-
icizing discourse on intellectual intuition and the perfect teaching. In his monograph 
on the Perfect Good, Mou writes about the freedom of a human being: “Although our 
existence in terms of our individual lives is something defined (jicheng 既成), it can 
still be improved [changed toward the good]. . . . Although all things between  heaven 
and earth are defined existences, they still are not determined (dingxing 定性) exis-
tences.”57 If we follow Mou and accept that their moral feeling enables humans to 
become agents of the genuine heart and if we agree that, in this, what they do indeed 
is to act freely, then we have to admit a way in which the agent of free will, noumenal 
according to Mou, can guide acts affecting and transforming the natural world. If 
Mou states that humans are defined, he seems to admit the triviality that as physical 
beings we are following the laws of nature.
Now, we might argue that our experience in fact also tells us that there are many 
situations where we are free to decide what we do and what we don’t. Our common-
sense perspective seems to defy any attempt at declaring this experienced fact as 
mere illusion. If I decide to drop a book, there are doubtless many physical  processes 
involved — in my brain and my nervous and muscular systems, as well as in the phys-
ical body of the book and the surrounding setting. Yet, although it is quite certain that 
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there is, in my brain, a neural, and hence physical, state contemporaneous with my 
mental state of deciding to drop the book, people like Putnam have argued, convinc-
ingly in my view, that there is no functional relation, let alone an identity, between 
that physical state and the mental content.
If humans were nothing but natural beings, they would be entirely determined by 
the laws of nature. Free will would only be a subjective illusion. Of course, as natural 
beings humans, just like all other natural things, are physical and hence determined 
by the laws of nature — they are what Mou calls “defined” in the lines above. Yet 
given the complexity of the entirety of human experience, both Sellars and Putnam 
have argued that it is simply not conceivable that each and every element in it is 
 reducible to a physical event in the sense of an eliminative naturalism.
For Mou, too, laws of nature imply essentially rational factors — namely their 
logical or mathematical structures. And even if Mou could be proven wrong on this 
point, the laws of nature have to be related to everyday experiences and practices in 
order to play any explanatory role. Even if an explanation is conceived of as elimina-
tive, one has to know what it eliminates in order to recognize it as an explanation. 
That the scientific picture of the world will at some point entirely replace what Sellars 
called its manifest picture simply seems improbable, as the scientific picture remains 
totally opaque if entirely dissociated from the latter. This does not mean that the real-
ity that the natural laws capture depends on our knowledge of it. But it claims that 
the conception of this reality as laws is not comprehensible, and impossibly under-
stood in terms of eliminative explanation, if it is isolated from its embedding in the 
highly redundant world of everyday experience.
But let us get back to free will: if it is already erroneous to assume that mental 
states can either be identified with or functionally related to neurophysical states, 
how much more difficult would it seem to imagine that such combinations of mental 
states and actions are in any straightforward way explained in merely physical terms? 
It seems to me that Mou’s distinction between “defined” and “determined” might 
indicate a possibility to conceive his self-declared belief in freedom as something 
more than a simple belief: Mou is convinced and tries to show that even the very 
possibility of natural science is essentially based on our human condition — for ex-
ample the human need to think in terms of objects and relations — if one is to think 
at all. We might therefore try to argue, in Mou’s vein, that just like the idea of free-
dom, the very idea of explanation, and hence all attempts to eliminate freedom as a 
legitimate concept of human self-reflection, depends on specifically human precon-
ditions. Although it may be useful for some scientific investigations to try to eliminate 
mental factors like will, it appears that it is unconceivable as a matter of principle 
systematically to relate a person’s proneness to understand herself as acting freely to 
a specific neurophysical state of her brain.
Of course, the preceding lines have only drawn a coarse sketch of what would 
need to be developed and expounded in much more detail. What I intended to sug-
gest is simply that there is a way of making sense of Mou’s talk of intellectual intu-
ition, a way of lifting its concealing veil and relating it to our everyday experience. 
It seems possible to address the questions Mou raises without taking to the letter the 
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apparent impenetrability of his kind of moral metaphysics to any kind of discursive 
mode of speaking.
If Mou’s emphasis on the internal aspect of meaning, on the individual and intu-
itive accessibility of moral acting, on the irreducibility to a merely descriptive or 
regimented language of central human experiences can be dissociated from the gran-
diloquence of his metaphysical musings on the absolute, there not only seems to be 
a way toward understanding the problems that Mou’s moral metaphysics attempts to 
address, but it might even seem possible to make sense of his “two-tiered ontology”: 
if it is essential to man that any one of us enters life in a way that is irreducibly indi-
vidual, internal, and only marginally communicable, if the language we speak and 
that we interpret out of our individual experience as human beings in interaction 
with other human beings is only in part reducible to the kind of regimented language 
used in the sciences, to name but two aspects suggested by Mou’s thought, it is mis-
taken, we might infer, to try to reduce ourselves to the picture provided by the sys-
tematizing efforts of science.
More generally, we are called to withstand any temptation to reduce ourselves 
to any picture, any representation, whatsoever. Drawing pictures of themselves is 
essential to humans. Yet, so is acting, the dimension that is, after all, reflected in these 
pictures. These two modes of being human, the representing and the acting, are mu-
tually dependent, and reducing man to either is fundamentally mistaken. This is the 
reason why it would be wrong to endorse fully a scientific picture denying human 
freedom. It would mean that we mistake what is inevitably one possible picture 
among others as an ultimate fact about ourselves. If this kind of reductionism leads 
to denying something to man, as Mou puts it with respect to intellectual intuition, 
what had always been available to him, it is guilty of severely impeding man’s devel-
opment toward perfection — the declared aim of Mou’s doctrine of humaneness. A 
picture is only meaningful in relation to human activity: every picture furthermore 
favors certain decisions while disfavoring others.
To do justice to Mou it seems important for me to notice that this does not mean 
that these pictures are but illusions or but appearance. Rather, they are warranted by 
the multiplicity of human activity that they depict. Yet, there are various pictures of 
the world and of ourselves. We know that one and the same experience is amenable 
to most divergent representations. That this is possible seems to presuppose an insight 
into the basis these various pictures draw upon. This seems a plausible way of making 
sense of what Mou sometimes refers to as a lived experience of acting as opposed to 
mere representation. It is the former that he tries to capture with his notion of intel-
lectual intuition. If so, its function to me seems to be regulative — it reminds us that 
any representation refers back to an act — which is not representable itself.
In this view, the contrast between a representing and non-representing ontology 
might simply refer to the mutual interdependence of the many pictures in which we 
conceive ourselves and the immediacy of our experience in actu of ourselves. The 
latter is what warrants that we are free to choose some pictures of ourselves and to 
refuse others. Because there is no picture that is fully adequate with respect to our 
immediate experience, it is demanded that we do not take the distinctions suggested 
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by the pictures as the last word. As in different circumstances, these pictures them-
selves might have been different; they are all merely relative. Our actions are there-
fore to be directed toward reconciliation rather than exclusion or separation. Yes, it 
is true that intellectual intuition in this sense is normatively void in that it is unable 
to tell us what, in a specific situation, we have to do.58 However, it seems that it can 
perfectly well give us a criterion for deciding which out of a certain number of alter-
native actions has to be chosen — namely the one that has the greatest potential for 
reconciliation. It can, that is, have a normative function also in evaluating alternative 
possibilities to act upon. The kind of pre-predicative experience, as we might call it 
in a phenomenologically inspired vocabulary, that enables one to become aware that 
one and the same event is amenable to utterly different representations — all equally 
highlighting certain aspects while blinding out others — in Mou’s view thus seems to 
be a precondition of our human experience, although we are unable to entirely ex-
plicate it in analytical terms.
Whether or not we deem such a thing as a pre-predicative experience possible, 
whether or not we regard it as relevant to issues of epistemology or ontology, what 
it allows is to make plausible why Mou thinks of that lived experience as a transcen­
dental foundation of knowledge. Although hardly reconcilable with the Kantian 
 notion of transcendentality, this use of the term nonetheless becomes traceable. In 
terming this assumed unrepresentable yet experienceable basis of human knowledge 
transcendental rather than transcendent, Mou simply takes into account that it does 
not transcend human experience: it would simply be wrong to call it transcendent. 
As a fundamental experience it is within the scope of human activity. As something 
that, at the same time, evades any attempt at fully explicating it in analytical terms, it 
marks a boundary of objective knowledge. Eventually, such a fundamental experi-
ence, although not entirely explicable in discursive language, is nonetheless commu-
nicable. We can tell others about the most intimate experiences of our lives even if 
we admit that they are not reducible to propositions. In the metaphorical or paradox-
ical language of poetry, parables, or allusions, in the various kinds of non-technical, 
non-regimented modes of language, we are able to share with others that to which 
we ascribe an existential import to our lives. Or, to speak with Hegel, humans “can 
talk about what happened to them as the persons they are.”59
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or “without dispute” ( Jason Clower, The Unlikely Buddhologist: Tiantai Bud­
dhism in Mou Zongsan’s New Confucianism [Leiden: Brill, 2010], p. 242); 
N. Serina Chan uses “non-contestable” (N. Serina Chan, The Thought of Mou 
Zongsan [Leiden: Brill, 2011], p. 190).
2   –   A “type of truth” that, as N. Serina Chan puts it, “should regulate daily living in 
China” (N. Serina Chan, The Thought of Mou Zongsan, p. 92).
534 Philosophy East & West
3   –   Mou Zongsan, Yuanshanlun (Taibei: Xuesheng Shuju, 1985), p. 334.
4   –   Mou, Yuanshanlun, pp. 334–335.
5   –   For the crucial role of Mou’s perfect teaching for establishing his own interpre-
tation of the Confucian Way and his elevation of the “teaching of the heart” see 
also Olf Lehmann, “Moderner Konfuzianismus zwischen ‘Lehre’ und ‘Argumen-
tation’,” in Der Konfuzianismus: Ursprünge — Entwicklungen — Perspektiven, 
ed. Ralf Moritz et al. (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 1998), pp. 196–215, 
201–202.
6   –   Zheng Jiadong argues that it was exactly in this sense of “cultural continuity” 
that the term daotong — adopted from a premodern Confucian context — was 
conceived by most authors of the Republican period, including Mou’s teacher 
Xiong Shili. See Zheng Jiadong, Mou Zongsan (Taibei: Xuesheng Shuju, 2000), 
p. 161.
7   –   N. Serina Chan remarks that Mou’s new daotong “in sum . . . assert[s] the pri-
macy of the Ru moral and religious tradition in China” (N. Serina Chan, The 
Thought of Mou Zongsan, p. 89).
8   –   N. Serina Chan notes that “Mou’s moral metaphysics and cultural nationalism 
are entwined” (N. Serina Chan, The Thought of Mou Zongsan, p. 214). In her 
view, Mou regarded his moral metaphysics as “moving forward” Kant’s moral 
philosophy, an alleged achievement that “for Mou and some of his disciples . . . 
represented a splendid triumph of Chinese culture over Western culture and 
boosted their cultural nationalist pride in the face of the continuing global 
 dominance of Western culture” (N. Serina Chan, The Thought of Mou Zongsan, 
pp. 116–117). I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing to my attention a 
recent study by Jason Clower showing that it was the conceived struggle of 
 China with the West — rather than India — that was a decisive factor in deter-
mining the philosophical “reference texts” of New Confucians. See his “Chi-
nese Ressentiment and Why New Confucians Stopped Caring About Yogacara,” 
in John Makeham, ed., Transforming Consciousness: Yogacara Thought in 
 Modern China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 377–411. The 
most comprehensive study on Mou’s work in the context of modernity still is 
Olf Lehmann’s Zur moralmetaphysischen Grundlegung einer konfuzianischen 
Moderne (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2003).
9   –   Sébastien Billioud has noticed in Mou’s conception of moral cultivation a 
 certain tension between the idea of a gradual and an instantaneous realization 
of intellectual intuition. See Sébastien Billioud, Thinking Through Confucian 
Modernity: A Study of Mou Zongsan’s Moral Metaphysics (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 
pp. 216–226.
10   –   Jason Clower’s The Unlikely Buddhologist is the most extensive investigation 
of the significance of Tiantai Buddhism for Mou’s work. Hans-Rudolf Kantor’s 
Die Heilslehre im Tiantai­Denken des Zhiyi (538–597) und der philosophische 
 Rafael Suter 535
Begriff des ‘Unendlichen’ bei Mou Zongsan (1909–1995) (Wiesbaden: Harras-
sowitz, 1999) also contains a comprehensive discussion of Tiantai Buddhism 
based partly on Mou’s respective investigations. The relevance of Tiantai scho-
lastics for Mou’s own thought is discussed in the final chapter.
11   –   Mou Zongsan, Foxing yu bore (Taibei: Xuesheng Shuju, 1977), p. 7.
12   –   Ibid., p. 576.
13   –   Ibid., p. 578.
14   –   Ibid., p. 583.
15   –   Ibid., p. 576.
16   –   Ibid., p. 599.
17   –   Ibid., p. 638:
On the second level [i.e. of perfect teachings, Suter], there is only one system, and this 
is precisely the Lotus-sūtra’s which discloses from the expedients [of his teachings] and 
the traces [of his words] the real and original [Buddha], thereby establishing the perfect 
teaching of the Tiantai. Therefore a multiplicity of systems is only possible on the first 
order [i.e., of separating teachings, biejiao 別教, Suter], because [first order systems] are 
analytical statements and [thereby] also contestable — anything which is analytically 
stated is contestable; but in second order [systems], there is only unity but no duality, 
and for this reason they state in a non- analytical way, basing their instructions on para-
doxical ‘identity’ ( guijue de ‘ji’ 詭譎的­「­即」). Thus, among the sūtras of this second order 
one is empty (xu 虛), one is substantial [real] (shi 實). The empty one is the Prajñāpāramitā- 
sūtra, the substantial one the Lotus­sūtra. Both are uncontestable, as both instruct on the 
basis of paradoxical ‘identity’.
  On Mou’s use of biejiao see Clower, The Unlikely Buddhologist, pp. 103–104.
18   –   Mou, Foxing yu bore, p. 598.
19   –   Ibid., p. 599.
20   –   Ibid., p. 602.
21   –   Mou puts this in the following way:
As the Buddha has introduced discursive explanations (fenbie shuo 分別說), there needs 
to be a different method of instruction allowing him to turn the obstructions within this 
differentiating speech into a universal teaching (tonghua 通化). This method allows one 
to recognize that in spite of the instrumental role of differentiating speech, all and every-
thing in its entirety is but one so that all distinctions are swept away by the disappear-
ance of any differentiating characteristics whatsoever, that consequently, one is allowed 
neither to give in to fixation nor to submit to obstruction, that there is nothing either to 
be chosen or to be refuted. This “different way” is the dharma-gate of non- contending 
wisdom (wuzheng bore 無諍般若). (Mou, Foxing yu bore, p. 1205)
22   –   On the reason for the “non-contending” character of Buddha’s speech Mou 
writes:
536 Philosophy East & West
If the Buddha says something specific, and if he does so in this specific manner, then 
basically this is only a salvific instrument (upāya), speech as didactic means. If one 
 recognizes that it is speech as a means, that it is not necessary at all, then, too, it is not 
necessary to raise any objection, and in this, the fixating mind transforms into a de-
tached mind. . . . By [this] transformation the detached mind is disclosed, and this nec-
essarily brings about a non-contending wisdom that is apt to erase both all conceptual 
elaborations (xilun 戲論) and all dharmic hindrances and transgressions, so that one 
reaches true liberation. (Mou, Foxing yu bore, p. 1205)
23   –   Mou, Foxing yu bore, p. 1205.
24   –   Ibid., p. 1210.
25   –   To exemplify this Mou states that the doctrines of the “storehouse- consciousness” 
(ālayavijñāna) and of the “womb of Buddhahood” (tathāgagarbha) are only 
 “arbitrarily advanced alternative possibilities” for providing an explanatory ra-
tionale for Buddhist salvific practice (Mou, Foxing yu bore, p. 1213).
26   –   Mou, Foxing yu bore, p. 1205.
27   –   Ibid., p. 1213.
28   –   Mou, Yuanshanlun, p. 305.
29   –   Ibid.
30   –   Mou, Foxing yu bore, p. 1023. At the end of this short remark, Mou refers the 
reader to the notion of an “inclusive” perfect teaching discussed in his Xian­
xiang yu wuzishen, concluding that “this said, they [i.e., the Buddhist and Con-
fucian perfect teachings] have to be one and the same (tongtong yiru 同同一如), 
even if their approaches are not the same” (ibid.). For the notion of an “inclusive 
perfect teaching” see below.
31   –   Mou, Foxing yu bore, p. 1023.
32   –   Ibid., p. 830.
33   –   Ibid.
34   –   See Chuanxilu III, no. 315, in Wing-tsit Chan, trans., Wang Yangming: Instruc­
tions for Practical Living (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 243–
245.
35   –   Mou, Yuanshanlun, p. 317.
36   –   Ibid., p. 318.
37   –   Ibid.
38   –   Mou Zongsan, Xianxiang yu wuzishen (Taibei: Xuesheng Shuju, 1990), p. 454.
39   –   Ibid.
40   –   Ibid.
41   –   Ibid., p. 455.
 Rafael Suter 537
42   –   Mou, Yuanshanlun, p. ii.
43   –   Mou Zongsan, Zhengdao yu zhidao (Taibei: Xuesheng Shuju, 1991), p. 4.
44   –   Mou, Xianxiang yu wuzishen, p. xvii.
45   –   Mou, Yuanshanlun, p. xi. To my knowledge the most detailed attempt at recon-
structing Mou’s argument entwining the Kantian notion of the “Highest Good” 
(summum bonum) and his Confucian variant of a perfect teaching is undertaken 
by Lehmann, Zur moralmetaphysischen Grundlegung einer konfuzianischen 
Moderne, pp. 109–135. In many respects, the present article draws on Leh-
mann’s much more detailed work. The reader will notice, however, that I do not 
share Lehmann’s view that, in trying to understand Mou’s references to Kant-
ianism, we have to base ourselves on “as conventional, ‘non-creative’ (nicht­
kreativ), and ‘faithful’ (artig) an interpretation of the notion of transcendentalism 
as possible.” See Lehmann, Zur moralmetaphysischen Grundlegung einer kon­
fuzianischen Moderne, p. 34 n. 54.
46   –   Mou, Yuanshanlun, p. 334.
47   –   Stephan Schmidt bases himself on Mou’s identification of a prioricity and in-
nateness for arguing that this implies, from a Kantian perspective, the heteron-
omous character of Mou’s so-called moral autonomy. See his “Mou Zongsan, 
Hegel, and Kant: The Quest for Confucian Modernity,” Philosophy East and 
West 61, no. 2 (2011): 260–302, 266.
48   –   Mou, Yuanshanlun, p. 332.
49   –   Julia Ching, “Confucian Way (Tao) and Tao-T’ung,” Journal of the History of 
Ideas 35, no. 3 (1974): 371–388, 379.
50   –   Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, “The Positivity of the Christian Religion,” in 
Early Theological Writings, trans. T. M. Knox (Chicago: University of Chicago, 
1948), pp. 67–181, 172.
51   –   Hegel, “The Positivity of the Christian Religion,” p. 173.
52   –   “If a religion attaches an eternal significance to something transient and if rea-
son fixes its eye on the transient element alone and cries out about superstition, 
then reason is to blame for setting to work superficially and overlooking the 
eternal element” (Hegel, “The Positivity of the Christian Religion,” p. 177).
53   –   Joël Thoraval presents the case of Schelling’s “positive use” of the concept of 
intellectual intuition ( Joël Thoraval, “La question de l’intuition intellectuelle 
et la philosophie confucéenne contemporaine,” Revue internationale de phi­
losophie 232 [2005], pp. 231–245, 237–240). He discusses the similarity of 
Schelling’s and Mou’s references to this Kantian notion (Thoraval, “La question 
de l’intuition intellectuelle et la philosophie confucéenne contemporaine,” 
p. 241). Also Schmidt and Billioud notice that Mou Zongsan widely ignores the 
discussion of intellectual intuition by German idealists (Schmidt, “Mou  Zongsan, 
538 Philosophy East & West
Hegel, and Kant: The Quest for Confucian Modernity,” pp. 263, 279; Billioud, 
Thinking Through Confucian Modernity, pp. 83–89 — but see also p. 87). Like 
Thoraval, Schmidt suggests that one possible reason might be the crucial role 
of the positive interpretation of “intellectual intuition” for distinguishing the 
two continents of Western and Chinese philosophy (Thoraval, “La question de 
l’intuition intellectuelle et la philosophie confucéenne contemporaine,” p. 241; 
Schmidt, “Mou Zongsan, Hegel, and Kant: The Quest for Confucian Moder-
nity,” p. 279).
54   –   Zheng, Mou Zongsan, pp. 166–167.
55   –   Ibid., p. 197.
56   –   Many have tried this: Stephan Schmidt and Sébastien Billioud have related 
Mou’s moral metaphysics to the thought of Emmanuel Lévinas. See, e.g., 
 Billioud, Thinking Through Confucian Modernity, pp. 23, 155–160; Stephan 
Schmidt; “Moralsubjekt und Erkenntnissubjekt: Zu einer kategorialen Unter-
scheidung im Denken des modernen Konfuzianismus,” Polylog: Zeitschrift 
für interkulturelles Philosophieren 19 (2008): 61–82, 78–82. Joël Thoraval has 
attempted to compare New Confucian intellectual discourse with Lacanian 
psychoanalysis rather than with academic philosophy. See Joël Thoraval, “Sur 
la transformation de la pensée néo-confucéenne en discours philosophique 
moderne: Réflexions sur quelques apories du néo-confucianisme contempo-
rain,” Extrême­Orient, Extrême­ Occident 27 (2005): 91–119.
57   –   Mou, Yuanshanlun, p. 306.
58   –   This is the conclusion of a convincingly argued and instructive article by 
Weimin Shi and Lin Chiulo:
As an act-deontology, Mou’s philosophy does not bring up any normative principle. 
And affectedly crossing-over, which is the way that Mou proposes for determining what 
ought to be done in a given situation, proves futile. This seems to indicate that Mou’s 
philosophy is normatively empty. Grounding morality on a metaphysical substance does 
not yield any content normatively relevant for determining right and wrong.
  See Weimin Shi and Chiulo Lin, “Confucian Moral Experience and Its Moral 
Foundation: From the Point of View of Mou Zongsan,” Philosophy East and 
West 65, no. 2 (2015): 542–566, 556.
59   –   Hegel, “The Positivity of the Christian Religion,” p. 181.
